Honesty in a Signaling Model of Tax Evasion by Pruzhansky, V.
TI 2004-022/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
   
Honesty in a Signaling Model of Tax 
Evasion 
 Vitaly Pruzhansky 
Department of Econometrics, Faculty of Economi s and Business Administra ion, Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute. 
c t
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
Please send questions and/or remarks of non-
scientific nature to driessen@tinbergen.nl. 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
HONESTY IN A SIGNALING MODEL OF TAX
EVASION
VITALY PRUZHANSKY
Abstract. We study the phenomenon of tax evasion using a sim-
ple signaling model, in which the signal is taxpayer’s reported in-
come. The novelty of our approach lies in the way we define honesty.
Specifically, we advocate the view that there are no absolutely hon-
est taxpayers: all taxpayers may under certain conditions become
evaders. We investigate the implications of this type of honesty on
the equilibria of the model, and compare it to the basic case, in which
honesty is absent. Our analysis completely characterizes all perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game, assesses their stability and
welfare properties.
1. Introduction
In a historical perspective the theoretical analysis of tax evasion can be
best described by dividing all existing models into two groups: first and
second generation. The classical literature of the first generation mod-
els studied a taxpayer who solved a gambler’s problem on how much to
evade, given an exogenous tax rate, penalty for tax evasion and detection
rate. The earliest formal analyses were given by Allingham and Sandmo
[1], Srinivasan [17], Yitzhaki [22], who analyzed how the changes of the
above parameters aﬀected evaded income. Their approaches diﬀered only
in the structure of punishments and assumptions about taxpayer’s atti-
tude towards risk. One common conclusion of all these models was that
the size of penalty and detection rate are substitutes, however increas-
ing penalty is costless, whereas increasing the probability of detection
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involves additional resources. Based on this, it led to the following pol-
icy recommendation: in order to maximize tax revenues minus costs of
audits one should set an infinite fine and zero detection rate.
It is essential to note that all first generation models were essentially
decision, not game-theoretic, and thus disregarded the eﬀects of the ac-
tions of one party on the other. Specifically, the above policy recom-
mendation did not constitute a Nash equilibrium, as is easy to check.
Despite this, we believe, quite serious drawback1, first generation models
of tax evasion, for some poorly understood reasons, are still being tested
empirically and cited without even mentioning this fact, eg. Frey [7],
Torgler [19] and [20]. The rationale for doing so is very obscure to us!
Second generation models of tax evasion (eg. Erard and Feinstein [5],
Graetz et al. [6], Reinganum and Wilde [13] and [14]) have adopted
a much more realistic, interactive, view of the tax collecting process.
Specifically, an independent tax collecting agency was included into the
analysis, whose objective function was to maximize tax proceedings net
auditing costs, given exogenously specified tax and penalty rates. Models
of the second generation explicitly used game-theoretic tools and looked
for Nash equilibria of the corresponding tax evasion game. The main
conclusion of this line of research was that the optimal auditing policy
(probability of detection) negatively depended on the amount of reported
income and that tax evasion declined with the rise of the taxpayer’s
income.
Neither first, nor second generation models performed satisfactory dur-
ing empirical testing. In particular, they predicted much more tax eva-
sion than was observed in reality. To cite just one example, Frey [7] (while
testing a first generation model on the data from Swiss cantons) reports
’...a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 30.8 would be necessary in or-
der to achieve the compliance rate of 76.5 percent...’. Empirical studies
of risk aversion, however, suggest that the latter coeﬃcient is between 1
and 2. With the purpose of achieving a better fit to the data, existing
models were modified. For instance, it was suggested that considerations
other than simple utility maximization, like honesty, fairness, responsi-
bilities of citizenship and the like also influence taxpayers’ decision to
pay honestly. The combination of all these factors has been dubbed tax
morale and claimed to be one of the most decisive factors stimulating
taxpayers’ compliance.
Positive eﬀects of tax morale can certainly be included in the analysis in
many diﬀerent ways. For example, following Frey [7], one can argue that
1See Section 5j for a discussion of how significant this issue is.
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tax oﬃcials are aware of the positive eﬀects of tax morale on taxpayers’
compliance, and, hence, treat taxpayers respectfully, so that morale is
not destroyed; as a consequence, tax revenues increase. In this paper
we propose a simpler and more intuitive approach. We associate tax
morale with inner honesty. The latter is defined as a force that may keep
taxpayers from misreporting their income in situations, when there are
positive gains from evasion in expected utility terms2. We then compare
a basic model, in which taxpayers are not honest in the above sense,
with the one, where honesty is in place. Expected utilities of both the
agency and taxpayers across all possible Nash equilibria are computed
and compared. One of our conclusions states that audits are not socially
optimal, in the sense that all parties could be made strictly better oﬀ by
boosting taxpayers’ honesty. We do not discuss how exactly this can be
done, though. Respectful treatment of taxpayers oﬀered in Frey [7] can
well serve as an example of such a tool.
To derive our results we use a simple signaling model, in which the
signal is the taxpayer’s reported income. As it is typical for this type
of models, multiple equilibria arise. To test their reasonableness we em-
ploy the intuitive criterion developed in Cho and Kreps [4], as well as
evolutionary and stochastic stability. It will be shown that all these re-
finements favor the same equilibrium, in which all taxpayers report their
income honestly. Another interesting conclusion is that the only equi-
librium, in which the agency conducts audits, is dynamically unstable,
since it involves mixed strategies. Despite its simplicity, we believe that
our modelling approach can be relevant to a wide range of situations,
in which cheating and punishments are not certain. (As an example,
consider payments for using public transport).
The current paper is similar in spirit to the models of the second
generation. However, contrary to them, we take up a local, not global
perspective. We do not aggregate all taxpayers in one population, some
fraction of which is always assumed to report honestly, whereas the mem-
bers of the other one are expected utility maximizers. Nor do we deal
with such things as budget constraints of the tax agency, which has to
extract maximal amount of taxes from the population of taxpayers, given
a fixed budget. Our approach is restricted to one tax collector and a rep-
resentative taxpayer. Furthermore, the word ’representative’, does not
refer to the whole population of taxpayers. It is interpreted in a much
narrower sense, say, a representative of a particular income category or
2Cf. the work of Erard and Feinstein [5], who assumed the existence of inherently
honest taxpayers, who always report their income truthfully.
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business firm of a certain size or type. Bearing these points in mind is
crucial for correct interpretation of our results, as is discussed in Section
5k.
Another important distinction between the framework we propose and
other models of the second generation is that our analysis is carried out
from a positive, not normative standpoint. Although it was forcefully
argued by Friedman [8] that the usefulness of a positive model can only
be judged by comparing its theoretical predictions with empirical data,
we do not make any empirical comparisons in this paper. In fact, we take
empirical evidence on the high level of compliance as given. Nor do we
intend to ’explain’ tax evasion with the help of this model by claiming
that it fits the data. What our model tries to achieve is to capture some
’hidden’, not immediately obvious, relationships behind the process of
tax collection and assess the welfare properties of stable, equilibrium
situations. In this regard, we believe, we are still in line with Friedman’s
methodology3.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model,
and Section 3 considers an extended version, in which honesty of taxpay-
ers is explicitly taken into account. Section 4 applies various equilibrium
refinements to the results of Section 3. Section 5 discusses interpretation
and possible extensions of the model.
Throughout it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the standard
game-theoretic terminology, such as perfect Bayesian equilibria and re-
finements thereof, evolutionary and stochastic stability4. Note that all
perfect Bayesian equilibria in this paper can be shown to be equivalent to
the stronger notion of sequential equilibrium that is the principal solution
concept for the class of extensive form games of imperfect information, to
which our model belongs. We have opted for perfect Bayesian equilibria
because they are easier to work with5, and because in the present setup
it involves no loss of generality.
2. The Basic Model
There are two players in the game: the taxpayer (player 1) and the
tax agency (player 2). At the beginning of the game Nature selects the
3Such an approach is not uncommon. For instance, the Solow-Swan model of eco-
nomic growth (see eg. Barro and Sala-i-Martin [3]) has the same descriptive character.
4For an excellent introduction to these topics see Osborne and Rubinstein [11] and
references therein. Young [23] is a classical source on stochastic stability.
5More specifically, a technical procedure of checking the consistency of players’
beliefs can be avoided.
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type of the taxpayer, τ ∈ {Y, y}. Here Y and y are two distinct levels of
income, such that Y > y; sometimes we will call them ’high’ and ’low’,
respectively. The taxpayer, having observed his type, chooses whether
to report it to the agency honestly or not. Finally, the agency, having
observed the report, but not the type of the taxpayer, decides whether to
audit the latter or not. These actions are denoted, respectively, by a and
d. It is common knowledge between the players that Nature selects τ = Y
with probability π, and that Y and y are the only types of income that
can be obtained and declared (see Sections 5a and 5g for explanations
and extensions).
Throughout the term cheating applies to any situation, in which the
taxpayer of type τ 0 reports τ 00 6= τ 0. Correspondingly, there are two cases:
when the taxpayer understates his income (i.e. type Y reports y), which
represents the instance of evasion, and when the taxpayer over-reports
(i.e. type y declares Y )6. Although it is somewhat counter-intuitive
to call the latter case ’cheating’, for the sake of consistency we do so.
All reported income is taxed at the rate t > 0. During the process of
auditing, taxpayer’s true income is figured out with probability one. If
the taxpayer who understated his income has been caught, he is required
to pay the missing amount of the tax, (Y − y) t, plus a fine, whose size
is proportional to the amount of income evaded and equals (Y − y) θ for
some θ > 0. If the taxpayer over-reports and is subsequently audited, the
agency reimburses the overpaid tax (this assumption is not crucial, see
Section 5b). It is assumed that both types of the taxpayer suﬀer losses,
φ > 0 if audited7. For the agency carrying out audits is also costly, and
for simplicity we assume that these costs, c > 0, are constant. Revenues
of the tax agency always consist of taxes paid plus the fine, in case it
applies, minus the costs of audits, if they are carried out.
A strategy (pure or mixed) of player i ∈ {1, 2} will be denoted by si. It
is not hard to see that both players will have four pure strategies. A pure
strategy of the taxpayer has the form τ 0τ 00, where τ 0, τ 00 ∈ {Y, y}. A pure
strategy of the agency has the form vw, where v, w ∈ {a, d}. Taxpayer’s
strategy τ 0τ 00 should be read as ’report τ 0 when Nature selects type is
Y and report τ 00 if Nature draws type y’. Similarly, the strategy vw is
interpreted as ’carry out v if report is Y, and perform w if report is y’.
Normally, a randomized strategy of a player is written as a probability
distribution over the set of his pure strategies. We, however, will rather
6All our results do not depend on whether it is feasible to pay a high tax from low
income at all, i.e. whether y ≥ Y t holds or not.
7This assumption leads to some surprising conclusion. We relax it later on, see
subsection 3.3.
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focus on how each type of the taxpayer behaves and with what proba-
bility the agency audits each possible report, i.e. on players’ behavioral
strategies. This makes the exposition more transparent and intuitive8.
In case the behavioral strategy si is mixed, probabilities with which two
diﬀerent actions are selected will be given in round brackets.
The above setup represents a typical Bayesian game with observable
actions. The solution concept usually employed for games of this type is
that of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In order to use it, one needs
to specify, so called, oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of the agency. Those will be
written as µ (τ 0|τ 00) , which should be read as ’probability that the true
type is τ 0 when the report is τ 00’.
Players’ payoﬀs, conditional on the report of the taxpayer, are sum-
marized in the following two tables.
audit don’t
τ = Y Y (1− t)− φ, Y t− c Y (1− t) , Y t
τ = y y (1− t)− φ, yt− c y − Y t, Y t
Figure 1: Taxpayer’s report is Y.
audit don’t
τ = Y Y (1− t)− θ (Y − y)− φ, Y t+ θ (Y − y)− c Y − yt, yt
τ = y y (1− t)− φ, yt− c y (1− t) , yt
Figure 2: Taxpayer’s report is y.
(Observe that each row in the above payoﬀ matrices is the choice of
income type by Nature and is not the strategy of the taxpayer. The
latter is the choice of a particular matrix.)
Without loss of generality we also assume that while indiﬀerent, the
agency always prefers to audit and the taxpayer to cheat. Furthermore,
8All results, of course, can be stated in the conventional manner as well.
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we allow that (Y − y) (t+ θ) > c holds. Otherwise iterative elimination
of dominated strategies leads to a unique outcome, in which both types
of the taxpayer report y, and the agency never carries out audits, no
matter what the reports are.
It is essential to note that von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities of the
players are identified with their monetary payoﬀs, thus all parties are
assumed to be risk neutral. For the agency this assumption is typical,
whereas it appears that the taxpayer is rather risk averse. However,
Section 5h will argue that there is no loss of generality in supposing that
the taxpayer is also risk neutral in the present context.
A quick analysis of Figures 1 and 2 leads to the conclusion that after
report Y the dominating strategy of the agency becomes d, that is pure
strategies aa and ad are strictly dominated. Moreover, report y is audited
if and only if the prior π on Y is suﬃciently high, i.e.
π ≥ c
(Y − y) (t+ θ) ≡ eπ.
Due to the assumption made, 1 > eπ. To make matters interesting, in
what follows we will always assume that 1 > π ≥ eπ. The first part of
this inequality is strict, for otherwise the game becomes trivial, the same
concerns the case π < eπ, see Section 5i. Throughout, we will refer to the
above setup as the basic model.
The game has the following two perfect Bayesian equilibria.
(i) Pooling on Y :
s1 (τ) = Y, for all τ ∈ {Y, y} ,
s2 (Y ) = d, s2 (y) = (β, 1− β) .
Where the probability with which the agency audits report y enjoys
1 ≥ β ≥ max
½
(Y − y) t
(Y − y) (t+ θ) + φ,
(Y − y) t
φ
¾
=
(Y − y) t
φ
.
(2.1)
This equilibrium is supported by the following oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of
the agency: µ (Y |y) ∈ [eπ, 1]. In words, both types of the taxpayer report
Y , and such reports are not audited. In case a low report y is submitted,
the agency audits it with probability at least (Y−y)tφ , since it thinks that
it has come from type Y with probability of at least eπ. The necessary
condition for pooling is that β ∈ [0, 1] , which implies φ ≥ (Y − y) t,
i.e. that personal costs of audit are high enough. Also note how the
assumption about players’ strategies in case they are indiﬀerent enters
here: when φ = (Y − y) t type y of the taxpayer is indiﬀerent between
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reporting honestly and over-reporting his income, however, by assump-
tion, the taxpayer cheats when indiﬀerent, and this preserves the pooling
equilibrium.
(ii) Semipooling:
s1 (y) = y, s1 (Y ) = (α0, 1− α0) ,
s2 (y) = (β
0, 1− β0) , s2 (Y ) = d.
That is, type y always reports honestly and type Y cheats with probabil-
ity α0. The agency audits low report y with probability β0 and does not
audit report Y at all.
The above α0 and β0 are given by
α0 =
1− π
π
c
(Y − y) (t+ θ)− c,
or, using the definition of eπ, simply
α0 =
1− π
π
eπ
1− eπ . (2.2)
As for β0, we have
β0 =
(Y − y) t
(Y − y) (t+ θ) + φ. (2.3)
In the calculation of α0 and β0 we used the fact that if a (type of) player
randomizes, then he has to be indiﬀerent, given the strategy of the op-
ponent. It is straightforward to show that α0 ≤ 1 and β0 ≤ 1. Observe
that there is no equilibrium, in which the strategy of the agency upon
receiving the signal y would be
β ∈
·
0,
(Y − y) t
(Y − y) (t+ θ) + φ
¶[µ (Y − y) t
(Y − y) (t+ θ) + φ,
(Y − y) t
φ
¶
.
Note the following interesting things about the semipooling equilib-
rium. First, some taxpayers (type y) always report honestly, and some
(type Y ) cheat with positive probability. The agency, however, being un-
able to distinguish between the two types, audits everybody, who reports
y with the same probability β0.Moreover, we will see that this is the only
equilibrium, in which the agency carries out audits!
Second, although type Y in fact ’forces’ this equilibrium, he does not
derive any gain in the utility sense from doing so, since the equilibrium
strategy of the agency makes him indiﬀerent between deviating and re-
porting honestly. Thus, in equilibrium the taxpayer cannot benefit from
cheating! However, due to audits, both types of the taxpayer suﬀer losses,
furthermore, the agency also bears the costs of audit. Even intuitively,
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this equilibrium is not socially optimal, i.e. Pareto dominated, and below
we will show formally when this is the case.
It is instructive to find players’ expected payoﬀs in these equilibria. In
the pooling one,
uP1 = [πY + (1− π) y] (1− t)| {z }
after-tax income
− (1− π) (Y − y) t| {z }
loss due to over-reporting
.
uP2 = Y t.
In the semipooling equilibrium we have
uSP1 = [πY + (1− π) y] (1− t)| {z }
after-tax income
− (1− π)φβ0| {z }
loss due to audits
.
uSP2 = yt+ πt (1− α0) (Y − y) .
It is intuitive that taxpayer’s losses due to audits are smaller than
those due to over-reporting, since
(Y − y) t > φβ0.
holds no matter whether (Y − y) t ≥ φ or not. Therefore,
uSP1 > u
P
1 . (2.4)
For the agency, however, the opposite is true since
Y t > yt+ πt (1− α0) (Y − y)
reduces to
1 > π (1− α0) .
Thus
uP2 > u
SP
2 . (2.5)
Hence, there is a conflict of interests in the game in the following
sense: the agency prefers the pooling equilibrium and the taxpayer - the
semipooling one. Such situations are typical in game theory; however, an
unusual feature of this model is that one party, namely the agency, can
induce its favorite outcome by simply announcing with what probability
it is going to audit report y, provided φ ≥ (Y − y) t. The costs of this
threat to the agency do not matter, since in equilibrium no deviation
occurs.
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Notice that if the agency aimed at maximizing its revenue, then its op-
timal strategy β∗ of auditing report y would depend on φ in the following
way
β∗ (φ) =
½
(Y−y)t
φ , if φ ≥ (Y − y) t,
β0, otherwise.
(2.6)
Of course, any β ∈
h
(Y−y)t
φ , 1
i
would be optimal in the case of pooling
on Y ; moreover, the precise value of such β does not matter, since it is
an oﬀ-equilibrium path. Nevertheless, we prefer to write β∗ (φ) = (Y−y)tφ
as equality, as if the agency were to minimize potential costs of audits.
Similar reasoning will apply to formula (3.8) below.
3. Introducing Honesty
There are many ways to account for the existence of honest taxpayers.
Following suggestions from extensive psychological and empirical litera-
ture9 on the subject, we allow that honesty is a social norm. Dishonest
behavior, thus, constitutes a deviation from the norm and inflicts on the
deviators personal costs in the form of anxiety or regret. This can be
modeled by adding a constant ξ > 0 to taxpayer’s payoﬀs in case he
truthfully reports his income to the agency, i.e. when his strategy is
s1 (τ) = τ for all τ ∈ {Y, y}. Such ξ may be interpreted as a moral re-
ward for being honest. Alternatively, we could assume that the taxpayer
obtains ξ uniformly, but the sense of ’guilt’ reduces his utility by ξ when-
ever cheating takes place. Of course, one may wonder, why to introduce
honesty in exactly this way. Section 5f discusses the rationale for doing
this.
In general, one has a great freedom in specifying the precise condi-
tions under which the taxpayer receives such a moral reward. Below we
present just two intuitive cases that, of course, do not exhaust the range
of opportunities. For convenience they are dubbed unconditional and se-
lective honesty. Throughout the analysis, ξ is assumed to be exogenously
given and commonly known to the players, see Section 5c for extensions.
9See, for instance, Torgler [19], [20] and references therein. Similar suggestions
have been made in economic literature as well, eg. Spicer and Lundstedt [16].
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3.1. Unconditional Honesty. We will say that the taxpayer is uncon-
ditionally honest if he always receives moral reward in the amount of
ξ, whenever he reports his type honestly, regardless the strategy of the
agency. The resulting payoﬀ matrices are displayed on Figures 3 and 4.
audit don’t
τ = Y Y (1− t)− φ+ ξ, Y t− c Y (1− t) + ξ, Y t
τ = y y (1− t)− φ, yt− c y − Y t, Y t
Figure 3: Taxpayer’s report is Y.
audit don’t
τ = Y Y (1− t)− θ (Y − y)− φ, Y t+ θ (Y − y)− c Y − yt, yt
τ = y y (1− t)− φ+ ξ, yt− c y (1− t) + ξ, yt
Figure 4: Taxpayer’s report is y.
There are three perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria now, of which the
first two resemble the basic case of Section 2.
(i) Pooling on Y :
s1 (τ) = Y, for all τ ∈ {Y, y} ,
s2 (Y ) = d, s2 (y) = (β, 1− β) .
Where the probability with which the agency audits report y satisfies
1 ≥ β ≥ max
½
(Y − y) t− ξ
(Y − y) (t+ θ) + φ,
(Y − y) t+ ξ
φ
¾
=
(Y − y) t+ ξ
φ
.
(3.1)
Again, the equilibrium is supported by the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs µ (Y |y) ∈
[eπ, 1]. The necessary condition for pooling is that personal costs of audit
are high enough, i.e.
φ ≥ (Y − y) t+ ξ. (3.2)
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(ii) Semipooling:
s1 (y) = y, s1 (Y ) = (α0, 1− α0) ,
s2 (y) = (β
00, 1− β00) , s2 (Y ) = d.
Thus, type y reports honestly, and type Y cheats with probability α0, as
defined in (2.2). The agency carries out audits of every report y with
probability
β00 =
(Y − y) t− ξ
(Y − y) (t+ θ) + φ, (3.3)
and does not audit report Y. It is clear that to support this equilibrium
we need to have
(Y − y) t ≥ ξ. (3.4)
Note that in the previous case the optimal strategy of the agency in
the semipooling equilibrium was to audit with a higher probability, i.e.
β0 > β00. This is an intuitive conclusion. Thus the social loss in this
equilibrium due to audits will be lower now.
(iii) Separating:
s1 (τ) = τ ,
s2 (τ) = d,
for all τ ∈ {Y, y}. The necessary condition for this equilibrium to hold is
given by
ξ > (Y − y) t. (3.5)
(Recall that in case of equality, type Y is indiﬀerent and, thus, by as-
sumption, cheats). This condition serves as an incentives compatibility
constraint for both types of the taxpayer, precluding them from misre-
porting their income. In the sequel, we will refer to (3.5) as the honesty
condition. Observe that it does not depend on the rate of fine10 θ, prior
π, costs of audit φ and c.
Let us compare players’ payoﬀs in these equilibria. In the pooling
equilibrium
uP1 (ξ) = [πY + (1− π) y] (1− t) + πξ| {z }
after-tax income
− (1− π) (Y − y) t| {z } .
loss due to over-reporting
uP2 (ξ) = u2 (P ) = Y t.
Note that πξ reflects the fact that only type Y obtains ξ, since type y
does not get ξ in case of over-reporting.
10This is true even for a more general configuration of punishing schemes, see
Section 5b.
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In the semipooling
uSP1 (ξ) = [πY + (1− π) y] (1− t) + ξ| {z }
after-tax income
− (1− π)φβ00| {z }
loss due to audits
.
uSP2 (ξ) = yt+ πt (1− α0) (Y − y) .
Observe that in the semipooling equilibrium taxpayer’s expected payoﬀ
is such as if both of its types received moral reward ξ, despite the fact
that type Y still cheats in equilibrium with probability α0 > 0. Moreover,
since the agency’s payoﬀs are not changed, the optimal mixed strategy of
type Y is the same as in the pooling equilibrium without ξ, and it yields
the same expected payoﬀ to the agency. Thus,
uSP2 (ξ) = u
SP
2 .
Finally, in the separating equilibrium we have
uS1 (ξ) = [πY + (1− π) y] (1− t) + ξ.
uS2 (ξ) = [πY + (1− π) y]t.
and no cheating or audits take place.
It is easily shown that
uS1 (ξ) > u
SP
1 (ξ) > u
P
1 (ξ) . (3.6)
uP2 (ξ) > u
S
2 (ξ) > u
SP
2 (ξ) . (3.7)
Paralleling (2.6), the revenue-maximizing strategy of auditing report y
becomes
β∗ (ξ, φ) =



(Y−y)t+ξ
φ , if φ ≥ (Y − y) t+ ξ,
β00, if φ < (Y − y) t+ ξ and ξ ≤ (Y − y) t,
0, if φ < (Y − y) t+ ξ and ξ > (Y − y) t.
(3.8)
Graphically all equilibrium cases can be shown in the ξ × φ plane as
follows.
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Cφ
ξ( )tyY −
ξφ +−= tyY )(
0
( )tyY −
B
A D
Figure 5: Admissible equilibria of the game.
Pooling equilibria occur in regions B and C; semipooling in regions A
and B; finally separating equilibria in C and D. Thus, separating and
semipooling are mutually exclusive types of equilibria, and these two are
the only mutually exclusive types out of the three. According to (3.8),
the agency will set β∗ = (Y−y)t+ξφ in B and C, β
∗ = β00 in A, and β∗ = 0
in D.
An interesting variant of unconditional honesty arises when the tax-
payer obtains ξ even in the case of over-reporting. This modification,
however, changes only the oﬀ-equilibrium strategy of the agency in the
pooling equilibrium. Namely, the probability of auditing low report y be-
comes independent of ξ and is the same as in (2.1). The agency’s beliefs
supporting the equilibrium are µ (Y |y) ∈ [eπ, 1], and revenue comparisons
expressed by formulae (3.6) and (3.7) remain valid.
3.2. Selective Honesty. Let us suppose now that the taxpayer receives
moral reward for paying honestly if and only if (i) his strategy is s1 (τ) = τ
for all τ ∈ {Y, y}, and (ii) such report is not audited. Alternatively,
we could suppose that once the agency erroneously audits an honest
taxpayer, the latter suﬀers ’moral’ costs of −ξ in addition to the auditing
costs φ. Formally, the payoﬀ matrices now become as in Figures 3 and 4
with the diﬀerence that ξ is removed from the taxpayer’s payoﬀs, once
the agency selects audit. All other respects of the model are not changed.
As in the previous subsection, the game has three types of equilib-
ria. Semipooling and separating equilibria are exactly the same as be-
fore. However, necessary conditions for the pooling equilibrium slightly
change. Now the agency should threaten to audit all reports y with
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probability bβ, given by
1 ≥ bβ ≥ max½ (Y − y) t− ξ
(Y − y) (t+ θ) + φ,
(Y − y) t+ ξ
φ+ ξ
¾
=
(Y − y) t+ ξ
φ+ ξ
.
(3.9)
A necessary condition for this pooling equilibrium is again φ ≥ (Y − y) t.
Once it holds, it is easy to show that
d
dξ
bβ ≥ 0.
This conclusion is not surprising, since when taxpayers have higher moral
reward for reporting honestly, more severe threats of the agency are
needed in order to discourage the taxpayer of type y from truthful revela-
tion. Note, that the same oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of the agency µ (Y |y) ∈
[eπ, 1] support this equilibrium.
As far as expected payoﬀs are concerned, in the pooling and separating
equilibrium nothing changes as compared to the case of unconditional
honesty. In the semipooling equilibrium, however, the agency receives
the same payoﬀ, whereas the taxpayer now suﬀers not only auditing
costs β00φ (1− π) , but also ’moral’ ones in the amount β00ξ (1− π) . As a
consequence, for the taxpayer the payoﬀ diﬀerence between pooling and
semipooling equilibria disappears!
3.3. Aggregate Eﬀects of Honesty. Let us summarize how the intro-
duction of honesty aﬀected the basic model. First, it follows that there
are no absolutely honest taxpayers. Suppose that the honesty condition
defined in (3.5) holds. Then for each honesty parameter ξ we may find a
tax level t such that any tax rate t > t will violate (3.5) and lead to eva-
sion (for instance, semipooling equilibrium). Hence, up to a certain level
people enjoy being honest, above this level they start behaving oppor-
tunistically. Correspondingly, the model loses its separating equilibria.
Although this conclusion is straightforward, other models dealing with
honest taxpayers, eg. Erard and Feinstein [5], do not reach it.
Although the agency’s payoﬀs do not explicitly depend on the ex-
istence of moral reward, the agency can be made better oﬀ provided
φ < (Y − y) t and ξ > 0 hold. This can be seen as follows. Once φ is
suﬃciently small, the pooling equilibrium is not possible any longer. In
the basic setup the only remaining equilibrium is semipooling. However,
when honesty is introduced in the analysis and (3.5) holds, the separating
equilibrium becomes possible. In this equilibrium the agency’s expected
payoﬀ is higher than in the case of semipooling. Moreover, the taxpayer’s
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utility is always higher in the separating equilibrium as compared to the
semipooling one. This exemplifies how audits may not be optimal from
the welfare point of view. In such cases enhancing honesty seems to be
a desirable policy.
The same conclusion, of course, would be reached if from the very
beginning we assumed that φ = 0. Recall that φ > 0 led to a somewhat
surprising result, namely it was possible that type y reported more than
it was due. To some the possibility that an honest taxpayer reports
more than it is needed may not seem reasonable. Hence, by ruling it out
and imposing φ = 0 one basically obtains the same result about positive
welfare eﬀects of honesty.
3.4. Comparative Statics. We conclude this Section with a brief dis-
cussion of the comparative statics eﬀects on the equilibrium strategies
along the equilibrium path derived in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. By as-
suming that inequalities (3.2) and (3.4) hold strictly, we can investigate
how small changes in the exogenous parameters of the model π, θ, ξ, φ, t, c
and the income levels Y, y aﬀect the equilibrium strategies of the play-
ers. Since in all formulae it is not the absolute level of income, but the
diﬀerence Y − y is the one that is important, in what follows we define
x := Y − y.
In both pooling and separating equilibria players’ strategies are pure,
thus infinitesimal changes of the above exogenous variables do not have
any eﬀect on the equilibrium strategies. For the semipooling equilibrium
the situation is diﬀerent, because it involves mixing. Using formulae
(2.2) and (3.3) we can write optimal strategies α0 and β00 as functions
α0 (π, c, θ, t, x) and β00 (ξ, φ, θ, t, x) . Then the following relations can be
easily checked.
d
dπ
α0 < 0,
d
dc
α0 > 0,
d
dθ
α0 < 0,
d
dt
α0 < 0,
d
dx
α0 < 0.
d
dξ
β00 < 0,
d
dφ
β00 < 0,
d
dθ
β00 < 0,
d
dt
β00 > 0,
d
dx
β00 > 0.
Whereas c, π, θ, ξ and φ have somewhat expected eﬀects on α0 and
β00, the same cannot be said about t and x. Intuitively, the higher the
income dispersion or the tax rate, the more ’profitable’ is evasion and
hence α0 should grow. However, the above formulae predict precisely
the opposite. The reason for this is that the semipooling equilibrium
involves mixed strategies. Thus, equilibrium probabilities with which
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players select their pure strategies depend not on their own payoﬀs, but
on the payoﬀs of the opponent. Hence, the more ’beneficial’ is evasion,
the higher is the probability of audits, and, as a response to this, the
lower is the probability of evasion.
4. Equilibrium Refinements
To narrow down the set of admissible equilibria one can employ a
refinement. Specifically, we will use the following three: the intuitive
criterion by Cho and Kreps [4], evolutionary stability in the spirit of
Swinkels [18], and stochastic stability in the dynamic environment called
adaptive play proposed in Young [23]. To safe space we will just focus on
the results. Details are left out and the interested reader should consult
the original papers if necessary.
The intuitive criterion rules out ’unreasonable’ beliefs of the agency at
those information sets that are not reached in equilibrium. In the basic
model developed in Section 2 both pooling and semipooling equilibria
satisfy the intuitive criterion, as is easy to check. This is still so for the
models in subsections 3.1 and 3.2, provided the separating equilibrium is
not possible, i.e. if (3.5) does not hold. What we will show now is that if
the separating equilibrium is possible (i.e. the honesty condition holds),
then it is the only equilibrium, which passes the intuitive criterion test.
First, as we noted earlier, separating and semipooling equilibria are
mutually exclusive. Thus, in the presence of the separating equilibrium,
semipooling does not obtain. Second, suppose that initially pooling on
Y is the case. This equilibrium is supported by beliefs µ (Y |y) ∈ [eπ, 1].
However, if ξ > (Y − y) t, then type Y never reports y. Thus the agency
upon seeing the oﬀ-equilibrium signal y should reason that it could have
been sent only by type y, and must not audit such a report. In other
words, given ξ > (Y − y) t, the only reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are
µ(Y |y) = 0. As for type y, he indeed would like to report y, since it earns
him as much as y (1− t)+ξ, which is strictly larger than the equilibrium
payoﬀ y−Y t. Hence, given the presence of the honesty condition, pooling
on Y does not survive. We can show these eﬀects graphically: on Figure
5 it would imply that the admissible region of the pooling equilibrium
does not extend beyond the vertical line ξ = (Y − y) t, regardless of the
value of φ. That is, pooling is confined to region B only.
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In order to investigate the evolutionary stability of the model, one
can apply a multipopulation11 evolutionary approach (see Weibull [21],
Chapter 5). The logic behind this type of refinement is that the game is
assumed to be played not by (in our case) two players, but two infinite12
populations of taxpayers and agencies. Furthermore, the population of
taxpayers is subdivided in two classes, corresponding to the two types
of income, whose relative proportions are π and 1 − π. Every member
of every population is programmed to play a specific pure strategy. At
each point in time one taxpayer and one agency are randomly drawn
from their populations and play the game. It is well know that mixed
Nash equilibria are not evolutionary stable, since players have multiple
best replies and each population can be invaded by mutants who earn
the same expected payoﬀs as the incumbents. Hence, the semipooling
equilibrium automatically fails the test for evolutionary stability.
The pooling equilibrium is pure, however, it is not evolutionary stable
either. The reason is that the signal y is not sent in this equilibrium,
therefore any response of the agency to y is optimal. In particular, mem-
bers of the population of agencies can costlessly decrease their probability
β of auditing reports y. However, once β ≤ (Y−y)t+ξφ , the taxpayer of type
y will deviate from the equilibrium by sending his truth-telling signal y.
Finally, it is an easy exercise to check that player’ strategies in the sep-
arating equilibrium are evolutionary stable, since such an equilibrium is
strict. By Proposition 5.1 in Weibull [21] we obtain that this is the only
evolutionary stable equilibrium of the game.
The notion of stochastic stability is designed to capture stability in dy-
namic situations when players can observe and analyze a sample of past
plays in order to predict future behavior of their opponents. All players
are assumed to be rational, in the sense that they compute their best
responses correctly with probability close to one. However, with small
probability they select their strategies at random, and hence may make
mistakes. To check stochastic stability in our game we can apply the re-
sults of Jacobsen et al. [10]. By Theorem 1 there, the only stochastically
stable equilibrium will be the separating one.
11Here one population represents taxpayers and the other population - the set of
identical tax agencies (or the set of servants in the tax administration).
12Not ’big and finite’, but infinite - one really needs a continuum of players. What
happens if the size of populations is finite see Slafer [15] and Weibull [21] p. 43.
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5. Discussion
(a) Can taxpayers have more than two types of income? Certainly
so. However, recall that our main purpose was to single out ’local’ and
individualistic, not global eﬀects of the interaction between taxpayers and
the agency. We can imagine that a particular taxpayer, say a business
firm, files a declaration to a servant in the tax administration, who is more
or less familiar with the type of income that such kind of firm generally
earns. In this situation two income levels are enough to capture the
tension between the parties. The model can be made more ’realistic’
by including many types or even a continuum thereof. Nevertheless, this
increased mathematical complexity does not seem to bring any significant
payoﬀ in terms of intuition.
(b) The fine may be levied in many ways. For instance, it may be
proportional to the amount of evaded tax, not income, or be lump-sum.
In the present setting with fixed levels of income and taxes all these mod-
ifications are equivalent. In a more general setup, for instance if diﬀerent
types of income are subject to diﬀerent tax rates, specifications of the
fine do matter. However, the diﬀerence will concern only randomized
strategies in the semipooling equilibrium and oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs and
strategies of the agency in the pooling one. As for our results about the
structure of equilibria and payoﬀ comparisons, they remain unaltered.
Similarly, the agency may not reimburse the overpaid tax to type y in
case it audits him, since this is anyway an oﬀ-equilibrium path.
(c) In the present analysis we took the amount of moral reward for
an honest type of the taxpayer as an exogenous variable. It can be
made endogenous in many ways. For instance, one could suppose that ξ
negatively depends on the probability of audits. This may be interpreted
as if taxpayers who are audited more often behave more opportunistically
towards the agency. We do not make ξ endogenous for the same reason
that we did not include more than two types of the taxpayer in the present
model. Such an extension is expected to yield simply a diﬀerent value for
the optimal probability of auditing report y. It will not change the nature
of equilibria or their welfare properties in any relevant way. In fact, the
reader can easily verify that the three equilibria we have derived are the
only possible types of equilibria in this tax evasion game, regardless of
the way honesty is introduced. Combining this with Section 5b allows
us to conclude that the overall logic of the model is stable under some
modifications.
(d) Without honesty, separating equilibrium is not possible in the basic
setup. One way of making it possible would be to adjust the model so
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that diﬀerent reports are subject to diﬀerent tax rates, then for some
values of parameters we will have separation. Specifically, if Y and y are
taxed by the rates T and t, respectively, then the separating equilibrium
arises whenever Y T < yt holds. This implies T < t, i.e. the tax system
must be regressive. However, condition T < t is not reasonable if both
types relate to the same income category or if we deal with corporate
taxation, which in many countries uses either uniform or progressive tax
rate.
Another way to enforce separation would be to adopt the following
auditing strategy of the agency. Suppose that if an audited taxpayer
turns out to be honest (i.e. his report τ turns out to be equal to his true
type, which is found out during the audit, by assumption), the agency
gives him a (monetary) bonus that has some positive utility. It can be
shown that for some range of parameters, though not uniformly, such
strategy would make it incentive compatible to report honestly. The
problem is that this strategy is not incentive compatible for the agency,
at least in the current setup, since the latter will never audit report Y.
(e) We aggregated expected utilities of both types of the taxpayer with
the same weight. Whenever this does not seem a plausible assumption,
our conclusions about payoﬀ comparison may be invalid. Nevertheless,
it appears to be generally accepted that all types of a player receive the
same importance.
(f) Some may argue that, perhaps, it is not only inner honesty and
some positive ξ but something else that is also responsible for high com-
pliance. For instance, factors like social stigma - based on the presump-
tion that evading taxpayers, if detected, will be ostracized - can also
explain truthful revelation. This, however, is only partially true. Specifi-
cally, costs inflicted on evaders by the society, in case dishonest behavior
is detected, cannot fully account for taxpayer’s compliance. It can be
shown13 that in order to make truthful reporting self-enforcing for type
Y , one somehow needs to increase his payoﬀ after report Y is sent, de-
creasing payoﬀ after report y does not achieve the same result! In other
words, increasing the size of punishment leads only to a lower probability
of evasion for type Y in the semipooling equilibrium, but it can never
eliminate evasion completely, as long as the taxpayer is an expected util-
ity maximizer.
13Formally, construct a 2×2 payoﬀ matrix, in which taxpayer’s pure strategies are
yy and Y y, and that of the agency are da and dd. Then observe that the only way to
make the truth revealing strategy Y y dominate the evasive strategy yy is to increase
taxpayer’s payoﬀ at the profile (Y y, dd) . This is exactly what the introduction of
ξ > 0 did.
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(g) We considered just two types of honest behavior and remarked that
this did not cover all possible cases. Certainly, the agency does not need
to know in which exactly way honesty enters taxpayer’s considerations.
We exclude this possibility and consider only situations, in which both
parties have ’common knowledge’ as to what game is played. This is
not a serious drawback. Games in which some parameters (payoﬀs) are
not commonly known can be modeled as games of incomplete informa-
tion. The famous purification result in Harsanyi [9], implies that in the
limit, when the amount of incomplete information tends to zero, each
Nash equilibrium of the original game can be approximated as the limit
of some sequence of equilibria of the modified game. Similarly we as-
sume that both parties agree on the numerical value of π. This common
prior assumption is also called Harsanyi doctrine. Its pros and cons are
extensively discussed in Aumann [2].
(h) Let s be a profile of strategies, xi (s) a monetary payoﬀ of player
i when s is played, and Xi a set of all possible monetary payoﬀs that
player i can obtain in the game. Consider an increasing and continuous
utility function ui : Xi → R. It is well-known that if ui (·) is concave,
then player i is risk averse. By applying ui (xi (s)) instead of xi (s) , we
simply rescale the original monetary payoﬀs of player i. That is, the ab-
solute diﬀerence between two monetary payoﬀs xi (s) and xi (s0) becomes
smaller in ’utility’ terms, i.e. |xi (s)− xi (s0) | > |ui (xi (s))− ui (xi (s0)) |.
It is not hard to see that if under these conditions some profile s is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, then it remains to be an equilibrium even af-
ter the rescaling. As for the mixed equilibria, they will change, because
payoﬀs have been rescaled in a non-linear way.
Therefore, in our game accounting for risk aversion of the taxpayer does
not aﬀect either pooling or separating equilibria. Nor does it change
the welfare properties of all equilibria, as defined in (2.4) - (2.5) and
(3.6) - (3.7). What it does change, though, are the optimal probabilities
of auditing, β0 and β00. However, their precise numerical values are not
essential in the present context.
(i) We could also consider the case π < eπ, which is identical to sup-
posing (Y − y) (t+ θ) ≤ c. Instead of pooling on Y and the semipooling
equilibrium, we would then have just one equilibrium, in which all types
of the taxpayer pool on report y, and the agency does not audit anybody.
Once honesty is introduced and separation becomes possible, this equi-
librium would be ruled out by the intuitive criterion, in the same way, as
pooling on Y was. In reality such a case cannot be dismissed as mean-
ingless; indeed for some groups of taxpayers it would be relevant. We do
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not treat it in detail here because of its relative simplicity and limited
applicability, as compared to the case π ≥ eπ.
(j) The analysis presented in this paper should not provoke a mislead-
ing conclusion that game-theoretic models of tax evasion are superior
to that of the first generation. The main diﬀerence between the two ap-
proaches is that in one case players take into account the consequences of
their own actions on the actions of the opponents, and in the other case,
they disregard them. We are strongly convinced that it is, first of all, a
matter of empirical evidence to see if in such a complex dilemma filled
with uncertainty, as evading/auditing decision in fact is, either taxpayers
or the agency are willing to take each other’s actions as random vari-
ables, to which subjective probability distributions are assigned. To the
best of our knowledge, there have been no such empirical studies. Thus,
either point of view can be questioned. However, as far as ’explanatory’
power of the model is concerned, the fact that it ’fits’ empirical data
on high compliance in the presence of low rates of audits, it should be
said that a first generation model would do equally well, if honesty was
introduced there in the same way we did it here. Namely, high ξ can be
identified with significant levels of tax morale, so that it makes it incen-
tive compatible for taxpayers to report their income honestly. Thereby,
the optimal amount of evasion will be reduced and, perhaps, a much
smaller and more realistic coeﬃcient of risk aversion will be needed in
order to be in line with empirical evidence. Nevertheless, those who
still cite and test first generation models today, completely disregarding
game-theoretic premises, do make a serious mistake!
(k) What does the model do and what does it not do? Let us sum-
marize what has actually been achieved. We will start from limitations.
First of all, the model does not predict a level of evasion in the aggre-
gate. It would be silly to claim that taxpayers either report high income
or evade with probability α0π, depending on the equilibrium. Similarly,
stating that the agency either audits with probability β0 (β00) all reports
y or does not audit them at all would not be wise. Players’ adherence
to their mixed equilibrium strategies rests on a very special assumption.
Namely, it must be common knowledge that any deviations from the
equilibrium strategies will be correctly exploited by the opponents14. In
most situations in reality this is hardly the case. Moreover, the players
may not have incentives to use their randomized strategies with equi-
librium probabilities, since, given the correct strategy of the opponent,
they are indiﬀerent in utility terms. This may lead, for instance, to the
14For more on this and related topics, see Pruzhansky [12].
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agency playing its maximin strategy, that guarantees the same level of
tax proceedings in expected terms after the signal y, no matter which
type is sending it.
Any other ’aggregate’ conclusions should similarly be avoided. The
model did not intend to describe how a taxpayer representing the whole
population interacts with the agency. Our aim was to emphasize particu-
lar features of the tax collecting process within specific groups of taxpay-
ers. Groups that are commonly known by both players to be relatively
homogenous with respect to such parameters as their true and evaded
income. It follows that across groups the equilibrium strategies of both
players may diﬀer. That is, diﬀerent groups may, in fact, coordinate on
diﬀerent Nash equilibria.
Finally, the reader should be aware of the ’unnatural’ interpretation
of randomized strategies in the context of a one-shot game. Biological
interpretations of mixing as shares of populations playing diﬀerent pure
strategies with these shares corresponding to the probabilities α0 and, say,
β00 are possible, though. However, thinking about mixing as the frequen-
cies with which the players choose their pure strategies over time does
not exactly fit in the present setup. Otherwise we should have modeled
the repetition explicitly, taking into account such things as taxpayer’s
reputation and the fact that players do not disregard intertemporal links
between plays. It appears to us that the best way to interpret randomized
strategies would be to view them as beliefs that one party holds about
possible actions of the other one. In this way the semipooling equilib-
rium models a stable social situation, in which players’ beliefs form a
Nash equilibrium (for a precise definition of the equilibrium in beliefs see
Osborne and Rubinstein [11], pp. 43-44).
As far as the merits of the model are concerned, the following three
points are worth mentioning. First, the importance of honesty per se is
immediate. There is hardly anyone, who would claim the opposite. The
model highlights this importance in a specific way, as welfare diﬀerences
between semipooling and separating equilibria. Second, selective and
unconditional honesty, being distinct modes of psychological behavior,
do not diﬀer much in terms of equilibrium payoﬀs or strategies. This
suggests that even more general configurations of honesty may, in fact,
lead to the same pattern of equilibrium strategies. Third, it appears that
situations á la semipooling equilibrium arise in reality most often. That
is, players’ strategies (beliefs) oscillate around the values, specified by
formulae (2.2), (2.3) and (3.3). Our analysis of comparative statics in
subsection 3.4 provides a useful insight on how these strategies (beliefs)
change with respect to the exogenous parameters of the model.
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